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COMMENTS
GONE WITH THE WIND: WHY EVEN
UTILITY PATENTS CANNOT FENCE IN
SELF-REPLICATING TECHNOLOGIES
JESSICA LYND∗
Genetically modified (GM) seeds are a self-replicating patented technology,
which through pollen drift can contaminate neighboring crops, leaving the
contaminated farmer liable for patent infringement. When pollen drift occurs,
the patent holder should not be entitled to enforcement rights. This is because
the self-replicating patented organism has itself caused the infringement and
has simultaneously failed the moral utility test. Furthermore, patent
enforcement should be void under the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritor
actio when infringement arises from unlawful trespass or nuisance caused by
the patented organism.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Since Monsanto first introduced genetically modified2 (GM) seeds
in India in 1998, more than 100,000 Indian farmers have committed
suicide.3 During the peak of the tragedy, which has been labeled by
some as the “GM Genocide,” an average of forty-six farmers
committed suicide each day, usually by drinking toxic pesticides.4 As
1. Monsanto Co. is a plant biotechnology and chemical company based in St. Louis,
Missouri that sells transgenic, also known as GM, seeds and herbicide products, including
Roundup Ready seed and Roundup herbicide, as well as Bt Cotton. Monsanto Corporate
Brochure, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Documents/Monsanto
_Corporate_Brochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
2. See Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits: An Overview of Issues in
Genetically Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 269 (2001) (defining
genetically modified seeds as having been inserted with “strands of foreign genetic
material in an effort to change or supplement one or more of the plant’s traits”
(emphasis added)). “Genetically modified” and “genetically engineered” are generally
interchangeable. See Glossary, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/
Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (using the same definition for both
terms).
3. See Priya Kumar, Biopiracy, GM Seeds and Rural India, GLOBAL RES. (June 2,
2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/biopiracy-gm-seeds-and-rural-india (tallying
over 100,000 Indian farmer suicides between 1997 and 2009 and attributing the
suicide “epidemic” to debt and depression caused by the failures of GM seeds); P.
Sainath, The Largest Wave of Suicides in History, ZNET (Feb. 13, 2009),
www.zcommunications.org/the-largest-wave-of-suicides-in-history-by-p-sainath
(associating the WTO programs with suicide rates where one farmer took his life
every 30 minutes); Somini Sengupta, On India’s Farms, A Plague of Suicide, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/19/world/asia/19india.html
(citing government reports of 17,000 Indian farmer suicides in 2003 alone).
4. NCRB Claims 46 Farmers Commit Suicide Every Day in India, INFOCHANGE,
http://infochangeindia.org/agriculture/news/ncrb-claims-46-farmers-commit-suicideevery-day-in-india.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (citing the National Crime Records
Bureau of India for the year 2007). At the same time India liberalized its cotton trade,
the government heavily promoted GM seeds at the urging of international lending
institutions, including the Inter Monetary Fund and World Bank, and as required by
government agreements with Monsanto to obtain the seeds. See Vandana Shiva, The
Suicide Economy of Corporate Globalisation, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Apr. 5, 2004),
http://www.countercurrents.org/glo-shiva050404.htm (“In 1998, the World Bank’s
structural adjustment policies forced India to open up its seed sector to global
corporations like . . . Monsanto . . . . The global corporations changed the input
economy overnight.”); see also Iqbal Ahmed, Killer Seeds: The Devastating Impacts of
Monsanto’s Genetically Modified Seeds in India, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Jan. 12, 2012),
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conventional seeds became increasingly difficult to find, small
farmers took out loans to purchase the GM seeds; despite claims of
increased production, the seeds required double the water of
conventional seeds, and some reports suggested the seeds were highly
susceptible to bollworm parasites.5 Many farmers lost their entire
crop and had no way of paying off their large debts.6
Exacerbating the farmers' debts, however, is that Monsanto's GM
seeds are licensed on the condition that the seeds will not be saved
for replanting,7 requiring the farmers to purchase new costly seeds
each year and placing the farmers further in debt. The stress and
shame resulted in the GM Genocide, an epidemic tragedy.8 Like in
India, GM seed patents in the US permit license agreements that
prohibit seed saving and allow causes of action for both the breach of
the license agreement, and the infringement of the patent, even
when breach or infringement occurred because of pollen drift.9
http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=28629 (stating that agreements
between Monsanto and the Indian state governments dictated the terms of disseminating
the GM technology); Vandana Shiva, Monsanto’s Seed MOU with Rajasthan Agricultural
Universities Cancelled, NAVDANYA, http://www.navdanya.org/news/214-monsantos-seedmou-with-rajasthan-agricultural-universities-cancelled (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
(reporting that Indian universities cancelled similar agreements with Monsanto in 2011).
The government also encouraged the local banks to provide liberal financing for the
seeds that cost at least two times the price of conventional seeds in India. See Ahmed,
supra (explaining that the unavailability of traditional seeds coupled with the ten-fold
price increase for GM seeds caused many farmers to take out loans to finance their seed
purchase); Andrew Malone, The GM Genocide: Thousands of Indian Farmers are Committing
Suicide After Using Genetically Modified Crops, MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2008),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1082559/The-GM-genocide-Thousands-Indianfarmers-committing-suicide-using-genetically-modified-crops.html (stating that most
farmers who commit suicide do so by swallowing insecticide).
5. See Malone, supra note 4 (refuting the promises of GM salesmen who claimed
to be selling “magic seeds”); see also Mae-Wan Ho, Farmer Suicides and Bt Cotton
Nightmare Unfolding in India, INST. OF SCI. IN SOC’Y (June 1, 2010), http://www.isis.org.uk/farmersSuicidesBtCottonIndia.php (contradicting Monsanto’s claims that
their Bt cotton GM seeds cause a decrease in bollworms).
6. See George Lerner, Activist: Farmer Suicides in India Linked to Debt, Globalization,
CNN WORLD (Jan. 5, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-05/world/india.farmer.
suicides_1_farmer-suicides-andhra-pradesh-vandana-shiva (quoting an environmental
activist who connected farmer suicides to corporate seed control, leading to increased
production costs for already-struggling farmers and falling food prices in a global
agricultural economy).
7. See 2008 MONSANTO TECHNOLOGY/STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT, MONSANTO,
available at http://www.monsanto.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/tug_sample.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) [hereinafter MTSA] (including a clausal agreement to not
save seeds).
8. See Sanjay Jha, Food Technology Driving Indian Farmers Toward Suicide,
NOWPUBLIC (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.nowpublic.com/environment/foodtechnology-driving-indian-farmers-towards-suicide (reporting that Prince Charles
believed that Indian suicides are due to GM seed use).
9. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(permitting patent holder rights to extend to second generation seed), No. 11-796
(U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013); MTSA, supra note 7 (prohibiting seed saving).
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Pollen drift can occur when cross-pollinating plants from GM seeds
naturally release pollen that can contaminate nearby conventional
crops growing on another farmer’s land—a farmer who is not paying
a licensing fee to the patent holder for the GM crop.10 Monsanto
filed over 144 lawsuits between 1997 and 2010 for alleged patent
infringement or breach of license for its seeds.11 And at least 700
matters have been settled out of court.12 The company has
investigated a much greater number through its heavily funded
investigation team and in conjunction with contracted private
investigator services.13
Patent infringement is a strict liability offense, and, as such, intent
or fault on the part of the alleged infringer is irrelevant.14 In
addition, courts have not found it relevant to infringement that the
GM contamination actually causes financial and legal harm to the
alleged infringer by contaminating his or her conventional crop and
trespassing onto his or her land.15

10. See Kolehmainen, supra note 2, at 280 (describing pollen drift and explaining
that “genetically modified plants produce pollen that may also contain the foreign
genetic material” and that the “pollen can be picked up by insects, birds, wind, or
rain and carried into neighboring fields”). If a neighboring field is producing
organic crops, it may be unable to sell its product, which “happened to organic corn
chip maker Terra Prima, who lost $87,000 when its European exports tested positive
for GM ingredients.” Id.; see also Amelia P. Nelson, Note, Legal Liability in the Wake of
StarLinkTM: Who Pays in the End?, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 241, 251–52 (2002) (describing
pollen drift as the “intermixing of pollen by air or animal during the time of
pollination”).
11. See First Amended Complaint at 1–2, 46–47, Organic Seed Growers & Trade
Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 2163-NRB),
available at http://www.osgata.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/OSGATA-AmendedComplaint.pdf (seeking a declaratory judgment to prevent Monsanto’s use of its
aggressive patent-enforcement tactics against farmers who never intended to use
transgenic seeds).
12. See E. Freeman, Settling the Matter—Part 5, MONSANTO (Nov. 11, 2008),
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Settling-the-Matter-Part-5.aspx (citing
a Monsanto employee who stated that most farmers are willing to settle infringement
claims before trial because it is more economical than fighting the allegations).
13. Compare E. Freeman, Seed Police?
Part 4, MONSANTO (Nov. 10, 2008),
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Seed-Police-Part-4.aspx (explaining a
friendly process for investigating farmers for infringement or breach), with CTR. FOR FOOD
SAFETY, MONSANTO VS. U.S. FARMERS 24–28 (2005) [hereinafter CFS REPORT], available at
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/CFSMOnsantovsFarmerReport1.13.05.pdf
(describing the experiences of several farmers who report they were verbally harassed and
intentionally intimidated).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (omitting intent or fault as elements of patent
infringement); see also Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent
Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1590 (2011) (describing the strict liability nature
of patent infringement).
15. See, e.g., Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp.
2d 544, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), No. 12-1298 (Fed. Cir. argued Jan. 10, 2013); Monsanto
Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 96–97 (Can.) (ignoring any harm
to the farmer in holding him liable for patent infringement).
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When such circumstances are present, the infringer is punished
despite taking no action to infringe, which seems to go against the
traditional notions of the Patent Act. The original language of the
Patent Act of 1793,16 as authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined
patentable subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter.”17 The word “art” was later
changed to “process,” but the usefulness requirement survived the
patent statutes of 1836, 1870, 1874, and 1952.18
This Comment argues that patent rights should be unenforceable
when infringement is caused by the patented subject matter itself
and is injurious. Although patents are currently enforceable in such
circumstances, self-replicating patented technology—with its ability
to cause injury without human interaction—warrants a restriction in
patent rights because of the unique way in which it fails the moral
utility test. Moreover, this Comment argues that patent rights in
harmful pollen drift cases are also unenforceable under the
doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, which prevents claimants
from pursuing causes of action that arise in connection with an
unlawful act.
Part I of this Comment provides background on plant patents and
self-replicating technology, as well as the mechanics of pollen drift.
Part I also includes a case study on GM seed patent holder’s response
to pollen drift. Part II argues that patent rights should be
unenforceable when the infringement is caused by the patented
organism itself and creates an injury under the § 101 utility
requirement of the Patent Act. Alternatively, because the selfreplicating patented organism causes an unlawful act, such as trespass
or nuisance, the infringement protection is void under the doctrine
of ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Part II then describes the harmful
effects of allowing these infringement suits, which perpetuate the
elimination of food variety and biodiversity. Finally, this Comment
concludes that unenforceability of patent rights in circumstances of
pollen drift will provide a legal solution for farmers but will not
necessarily solve the economic and biological harms of pollen drift
from GM crops.
While this Comment focuses on the legal
implications of GM seeds, it may be applied to other self-replicating
technologies as well. The reach of synthetic biology, the science that
uses chemically-synthesized DNA to create biochemical organisms
16. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
17. Id. § 1; see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (referencing
Jefferson’s contribution to the 1793 Act).
18. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09.
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with new characteristics, extends beyond agriculture to vaccines,
medicines, biofuels, and biosecurity.19 Biotechnology may certainly
benefit society, but its significant scientific advances also require
advances in the law.
I.

BACKGROUND

The legal right to patent living organisms was initially extensively
limited by statute, but the right has been greatly broadened by case
law.20 While plants formerly were patentable only through specific
statutes, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) began
granting utility patents for plants in 1985.21 The Supreme Court
Patents for self-replicating
confirmed the practice in 2001.22
technology or living organisms are afforded an even more extensive
right to exclude because patent rights are extended to each new
generation of self-replicating technology—in the case of GM seeds,
the seed’s progeny.23
Self-replicating technology creates new
generations of itself without human intervention.24 If the new
generations of the self-replicating technology are created on a third
party’s real property or in combination with a third party’s personal
property, the courts view the third party as infringing on the patent
holder’s rights.25
A. The Recent Change To Grant Utility Patents for Plants
The Patent Act26 and the U.S. Constitution27 require that the
subject of a utility patent be useful. The Constitution grants Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
19. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS:
THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 36, 56–72 (2010),
available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo9019/PCSBI-Synthetic-BiologyReport-12.16.10.pdf.
20. See infra Part I.A (discussing the recent expansion of patentable material to
encompass plants).
21. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 447 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (granting
the first utility patent for a plant after the Supreme Court granted a utility patent for
a bacterium in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)).
22. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145
(2001) (holding that newly-developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter).
23. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that patent rights extended to second generation seeds), No. 11-796 (U.S.
argued Feb. 19, 2013).
24. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1591 (5th
ed. 2011) (defining self-replicating as “replicating oneself or itself”).
25. Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”28 Congress
exercised this power when it enacted the Patent Act, which in its
current form states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”29
The utility requirement in § 101 of the Patent Act has historically
consisted of three necessary types of utility: specific,30 substantial,31
and moral.32 Specific utility requires that the patented subject be
capable of “provid[ing] a well-defined and particular benefit to the
public.”33 In In re Fisher,34 for example, a patent was denied for
“expressed sequence tags” relating to maize genes because there was
nothing useful about the tags to the public; they were merely
“hypothetical possibilities.”35 Thus, inventions must actually function
as claimed and not simply be “theories” or “speculations.”36
Substantial utility requires the patented subject to have a
“significant and presently available benefit to the public.”37 This
entails being applicable in the “real world” and not just beneficial for
further research.38 In Brenner v. Manson,39 the Supreme Court found
that even though the chemical compound at issue was not
detrimental, it still did not merit a patent because its uses were still
being researched; thus, it lacked substantial utility.40
Though greatly limited and rarely applied today,41 the doctrine of
moral utility holds that usefulness cannot be injurious.42 Moral utility is
based on Lowell v. Lewis, where Justice Story held:
28. Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (adding that
Congress acts so as to positively affect society through the creation of new products
that lead to increased employment and better lives).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
30. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
31. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534; Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
32. Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925)
(denying a patent for a fake seam up the back of stockings giving the look of higher
quality stockings); Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89–90 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1889) (denying a patent for a gambling machine); Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018,
1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
33. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
34. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
35. Id. at 1373–74.
36. Perrigo, 48 F.2d at 966.
37. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
38. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–36.
39. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
40. Id. at 534–36.
41. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
42. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–33 (expounding on the definition of useful first
given by Justice Story in Lowell); Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (“[T]he law requires . . . that the
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[T]he law requires . . . that the invention should not be frivolous or
injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.
The word “useful,” therefore, is incorporated into the act in
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance, a new
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to
facilitate private assassination, is not a patentable invention.43

Justice Story’s moral utility test was later limited in Fuller v. Berger,44
which held that injuriousness prohibits patentability where it is the
only use of the invention.45 Where a patent subject can be used for
both injury and benefit, it is still patentable.46 The moral utility
requirement has been used to deny patents for morally objectionable
inventions such as gambling machines47 and deceptive inventions
such as stockings with a fake seam.48 It has also been applied where
there were “concerns about the morality of practicing the patent’s
underlying subject matter”49 and “concerns regarding the morality of
allowing anyone to limit the practice of the patent’s underlying
subject matter.”50 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,51 the Supreme Court
approved
a
patent
for
a
“genetically
engineered
bacterium . . . capable of breaking down multiple components of
crude oil”52 even though the living thing “may spread pollution and
disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its
practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life.”53 Although
the Supreme Court rejected the application of moral utility as a basis

invention . . . not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being . . . of society. The word
‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or
immoral.”); see also In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 978 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (finding that
although the compound at issue lowered blood sugar, the drug’s high toxicity
negated its utility).
43. See Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019 (emphasis added) (referring to the former
Patent Act, with the same definition); see also Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–35 (building
upon the standard from Lowell to define useful as more than just “not positively
harmful to society” (emphasis added)). But see Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932
F.2d 920, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting an argument that patent protections are
issued for the public good rather than for private benefit on the grounds that this
interpretation is overbroad and would enable almost anyone to collaterally attack the
validity of patents).
44. 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903).
45. Id. at 275.
46. Id.
47. Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89–90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889).
48. Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925).
49. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in
Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 495 (2003) (listing “multi-cellular animals,
human-animal chimera, and human cloning” as subject matters of concern).
50. Id. (citing “medical process methods”).
51. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
52. Id. at 305.
53. Id. at 316.

LYND.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

GONE WITH THE WIND

2/28/2013 1:15 PM

671

for denying patents for living microorganisms,54 moral utility has
been applied for denying patents for part-human organisms.55 The
PTO has rejected an application for a chimeric embryo made from
both a human and non-human and applied Lowell in doing so,
referring to the partially human organisms as “immoral” and as
“monsters.”56
Despite the remnants of moral utility, “the USPTO has issued
patents to inventions that may arguably be illegal at least in certain
jurisdictions.”57 The courts have justified this because “a patent is not
the granting of a right to make, use or sell” the invention.58 Instead,
a patent “grants only the right to exclude others from making, using
or selling the patented device.”59 Thus, the object cannot become
injurious without human intervention.
When applied, all three forms of utility assess the invention
overall—regardless of whether it is at the time of granting the
patent60 or during trial.61 If utility is missing, it completely invalidates
the patent—as opposed to restricting the patent rights only under
particular circumstances, such as when human intervention uses a
patented technology in an injurious way.62
Similar to Justice Story’s interpretation that the law could not
protect harmful inventions by awarding them a patent, in 1775, Lord
Mansfield stated, “[n]o Court will lend its aid to a man who founds
54. Id. at 316–17.
55. Non-Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application No. 8,993,564, at 28 (Jan. 29, 2003).
56. Id. at 24–25, 28; see also Mark Dowie, Gods and Monsters, MOTHER JONES,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/01/gods-and-monsters (last visited Feb.
20, 2013) (referring to the press conference held by the Commissioner of Patents
regarding the chimera). Section 33(a) of the America Invents Act now adds:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed
to or encompassing a human organism.” Leahy-Smith American Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
57. Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) (statement
of James Toupin, General Counsel, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); see, e.g.,
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot Be
Patented, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 365–66 (2007) (“During Prohibition, for
example, a patent was issued for a method of producing alcohol. More recently,
patents have been awarded for radar detectors, cock-fighting equipment . . . all of
which are contraband in at least some states and/or under federal law.” (footnotes
omitted)).
58. Little Mule Corp. v. Lug All Co., 254 F.2d 268, 272–73 (5th Cir. 1958).
59. Id.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
61. Id. § 282 (allowing for a defendant to challenge the validity of an existing
patent as a defense to infringement); id. § 302 (allowing the PTO to reexamine an
already-issued patent to reassess validity).
62. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (vacating the lower court’s finding of infringement because the patent was
invalid for lack of utility).
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his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.”63 The
doctrine, known as ex turpi causa non oritur actio,64 holds that “[n]o
cause of action can arise out of an immoral (or illegal) inducement
(or consideration).”65 This doctrine embodies the notion that
enforcing a right that simultaneously violates the law undermines the
rule of law.66 Ex turpi causa is commonly applied in contracts67 and
torts.68 The act need not violate a criminal statute.69 A contract, for
example, is considered illegal under the doctrine “if either its
formation or performance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed
to public policy.”70 Moreover, the doctrine applies to immoral and
illegal actions, both malum prohibitum or malum per se.71 Thus, both

63. Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.) 1121; 1 Cowp. 342, 343
(commonly cited as the origin of the ex turpi causa doctrine).
64. See Nahas v. George, 99 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ohio 1951) (translating the general
maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio as “out of fraud no action arises”); see also,
McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 654 (1899) (holding the maxim to mean that
the law will not lend its aid to a claim based on its own violation); Citizens’ Nat’l
Bank of Chickasha v. Mitchell, 103 P. 720, 730 (Okla. 1909) (same).
65. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (3d ed. 1969).
66. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 47
(2005) (explaining the legality principle, which embodies the notion that the law
must prevent arbitrariness by being clearly defined and consistently enforced so as to
avoid a situation where the public is unclear on what or which illegal actions will be
punished). Although the principle is often applied in criminal law, the same effect
will result when the laws broken by pollen drift are ignored, such as when patent
infringement is at play.
67. See Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir.
1991) (voiding a contract provision that prevented a person from running for office
as being against public policy); see also Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824, 833–34 (3d Cir.
1982) (invalidating a contractual provision purporting to preclude a legal services
group from recovering attorneys’ fees following a successful civil rights litigation
against the state because it violated public policy (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 178–179 (1981))); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:4, at 980–93 nn.15–22 (4th ed. 2009)
(listing a multitude of federal and state cases that have applied the doctrine to void
contracts as against public policy).
68. See Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire Muggers: Should an
Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived To Dent the Litigation Crisis?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
53, 82–86 (1995) (applying ex turpi causa to tort law in the United States via
proximate causation and public policy). Despite its traditional usage, the application
of the doctrine in U.S. tort law is on the decline. See id. at 86–87.
69. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932). This statement of the law has
been refined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178.
70. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 178 (abandoning any reference to the illegality of the bargain and
instead focusing on whether the contract is unenforceable on public policy
grounds).
71. Jones v. Dinkins, 76 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ga. 1953) (applying the doctrine);
Sewell v. Norris, 58 S.E. 637, 639 (Ga. 1907) (same); Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wis.
252, 254 (1872) (listing multiple cases affirming the doctrine’s underlying
principles).
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the moral utility requirement and ex turpi causa are concerned with
legal assistance to harmful causes.72
The legal protection for patenting living organisms has undergone
several iterations in the past century, each providing more expansive
exclusion rights than the last. Living organisms were not initially
granted utility patents; instead, patent protection for plants began in
1930 with the Plant Patent Act73 (PPA). The PPA limited patent
protection for plant germplasm to asexually reproduced plants
(excluding tuber propagated plants)—those produced by grafting or
cuttings and usually sold through a nursery, not seeds, and their
progeny.74 Because many agricultural plants are sexually reproduced,
or tuber propagated plants, the PPA protection was very limited and
did not include many staple or commodity crops such as corn, wheat,
or rice.75 The PPA only required that asexually reproduced plants be
“distinct and new.”76
Forty years after the creation of the PPA, the Plant Variety
Protection Act of 197077 (PVPA) extended patent-like protection to
sexually reproduced plants and seeds of novel varieties.78 The
standard for obtaining a PVPA patent-like certificate was less
stringent than the standard for obtaining a utility patent. The PVPA
omitted the non-obvious and beneficial requirements and instead

72. Compare Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (discussing the moral utility requirement for utility patents,
under which patent protections only apply to inventions that do not harm society),
with Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.) 1121; 1 Cowp. 342, 343
(creating the ex turpi causa doctrine under which courts do not allow recovery for
injury caused by a person’s own harmful conduct).
73. Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (current version at 35
U.S.C. §§ 161–164 (2006)). The current version of the PPA reads: “Whoever
invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of
plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings,
other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state,
may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
74. In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (applying the PPA of 1930
to hold that propagation by asexual reproduction is defined “by grafting, budding,
cuttings, layering, division, and the like, but not by seeds” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 711129, at 1 (1930))).
75. See JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492–2000, at 132–33 (2d ed. 2004) (suggesting that
Congress may have excluded sexually reproducing and tuber propagating plants
from the PPA because it did not want to grant monopoly-like patent protection to
staple food crops).
76. Plant Patent Act, § 1.
77. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–
2582 (2006)).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2006) (extending protection to sexually reproduced
plants, which are often the largest commodity crops in the United States, such as
corn, wheat, and rice).
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only required that the product be new, distinct, uniform, and stable.79
However, the PVPA also provided less protection to the patent holder
than a utility patent because under the PVPA, seed saving and
research do not constitute infringement.80 For example, a farmer
could save and replant patented seeds under the PVPA, but could not
sell the seeds.81
In the PVPA, Congress created a specific patent-like certificate,
distinct from utility patents.82 However, as the GM seed industry grew
in the 1970s and 1980s, agricultural companies began applying for
utility patents for their seed instead of PVPA certificates.83 Although
utility patents required a higher non-obviousness and usefulness
standard, the utility patent was favorable for the seed companies
because it did not include exceptions for research or seed saving.84
The Supreme Court’s Chakrabarty decision and the underlying facts
of the case provide an example of the industry attempting to use
utility patents for a non-plant organism.85 In that case, the Supreme
Court strictly interpreted the text of the Patent Act in extending
utility patents to the genetically engineered bacterium, despite the
USPTO’s disagreement.86 The USPTO first argued that the Patent
Act must exclude living things (such as bacteria or seeds); otherwise
the PPA and PVPA would not be necessary to authorize patent
protection for plants.87 However, the majority interpreted Congress’s
creation of the PPA and PVPA as an attempt to decrease the amount
of detail in a description, especially for more difficult categories such
as plants, and to explain that the work product of a plant breeder,
though “in aid of nature,” is patentable.88 Second, the USPTO
argued that Congress must explicitly name microorganisms as
patentable because they were unforeseen at the time the Patent Act
79. Id.
80. See id. §§ 2543–2544 (providing a right to save seed for personal use and a
right to breed protected plants for research).
81. Compare id. § 2541(a)(1) (providing that selling protected plants constitutes
infringement), with id. § 2543 (indicating that seeds may be saved for replanting).
82. Id. §§ 2321–2582.
83. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 447 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (granting
for the first time a utility patent for a plant—in this case a maize plant—with high
tryptophan levels).
84. Compare 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543–2544 (containing an exception for research or seed
saving), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (omitting any direct reference to plants or other life
forms).
85. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
86. Id. at 316–18 (explaining how the question before the court was narrow and
asserting that policy arguments on the dangers of patenting life forms should be
discussed by Congress).
87. Id. at 310–11.
88. Id. at 312 (quoting S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 7 (1930)).
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was enacted89 and because bacteria are explicitly excluded from the
PVPA.90 The Court disagreed that unforeseen subject matter
required explicit naming, asserting that the broad language of the
Patent Act accounted for unforeseen subject matter.91 The 5–4
majority held that because the respondent “produced a new
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature,” the bacterium was eligible for a utility patent under the
Patent Act.92
Following Chakrabarty, the USPTO denied utility patent
applications for self-replicating (sexually and asexually reproduced)
plants, reasoning that Congress intended them to be covered
separately under the PPA and PVPA.93 However, the PTO Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) decided in the 1985 case
Ex parte Hibberd94 that sexually reproducing plants were indeed
patentable.95 The Board applied a statutory construction rule
requiring that when two acts govern the same issue, courts must “give
effect to both unless there is . . . [an] ‘irreconcilable’” difference
between them.96 Thus, the Board reasoned that the PPA and PVPA
did not exclude issuing utility patents for plants.97 Subsequently, the
USPTO began accepting utility patent applications for plants.98
In 2001, the Supreme Court decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.99 upheld the use of utility patents for
plants using the same reasoning as the Board in Hibberd.100 Both
courts agreed that because Congress failed to explicitly exclude
plants in the Patent Act’s provision on utility patents and failed to
89. Id. at 314–15.
90. Id. (arguing that Congress did not intend to include non-plant “living”
organisms, such as bacterium, in the PVPA); see 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1970) (“The
breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria,
or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, or his successor in
interest, shall be entitled to plant variety protection . . . .”).
91. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315.
92. Id. at 310 (noting that the bacterium also had “the potential for significant
utility”).
93. See KEITH AOKI, SEED WARS: CONTROVERSIES AND CASES ON PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 42 (2008).
94. 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (B.T.A.I. 1985).
95. Id. at 443–48 (rejecting the argument that Congress intended to exclude
sexually reproducing plants from 35 U.S.C. § 101).
96. Id. at 445–46.
97. Id. at 444–46.
98. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 12 (arguing that the USPTO began
granting utility patents for plants even though “Congress had never given the U.S.
PTO authority to grant utility patents for sexually reproducing plants”).
99. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
100. Compare id. at 138 (determining that utility patents cover a larger scope than
the PVPA’s patent-like certificates), with Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 444–45
(finding that Congress did not limit the scope of utility patents).
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state that the PPA and PVPA were the exclusive protections available
for plants, extending patents to plants is not contrary to
congressional intent.101 The Court also stated that the USPTO had
been issuing utility patents for plants for sixteen years—since
Hibberd—with no disagreement from Congress.102 By affirming
multiple provisions for patents or patent-like protections for living
organisms, these cases encouraged the commoditization of seeds and
the expansion of biotechnology products.103
B. GM Seeds Capable of Pollen Drift and Saving Seeds
There are at least two GM products relevant in the context of
pollen drift: cross-pollinated herbicide-tolerant GM seeds and crosspollinated insect-resistant GM seeds.104 Herbicide-tolerant GM seeds
include the Roundup Ready system through which GM seeds, such as
wheat, are genetically modified to resist the herbicide Roundup.105
This allows the farmer to spray Roundup on the entire field, thereby
killing the weeds, but not the GM wheat.106 Roundup Ready
agricultural seeds include alfalfa, canola, cotton, and sugar beets.107
The second group includes insect-resistant GM seeds such as corn,
containing the bacterium bacillus thuringiensis, known as “Bt Corn.”108

101. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 138; Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 444–45.
102. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 144–45; see also Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 443–44.
103. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 75, at 282 (“The legal and technical capacities
are now in place that will permit capital to realize the apotheosis of the seed as a
commodity-form.”).
104. See Agricultural Seeds, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages
/Monsanto-agricultural-seeds.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (listing their agricultural
seed products, including canola, corn, cotton, and soybeans); see also Glossary, supra
note 2 (explaining that “trait stacking” produce seeds are insect-resistant and
“herbicide toleran[t]”).
105. See Roundup Ready System, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanag
ement/Pages/roundup-ready-system.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that
Roundup herbicide works in conjunction with Roundup-resistant seeds).
106. See John Russnogle, Roundup Ready Soybean System Simply Works, CORN & SOYBEAN
DIGEST (Aug. 1, 1998), http://cornandsoybeandigest.com/roundup-ready-soybeansystem-simply-works (explaining that farmers only need to spray Roundup Ultra about
a month after planting Roundup Ready seeds).
107. Roundup Ready System, supra note 105. Monsanto also sells Roundup Ready
soybeans, but because they are self-pollinating, the soybeans are not subject to pollen
drift. Tim Van Pelt, Note, Is Changing Patent Infringement Liability the Appropriate
Mechanism for Allocating the Cost of Pollen Drift?, 31 J. CORP. L. 567, 586 (2006).
However, their seeds could still be blown or moved via animal and machinery and
thus, still contaminate other fields. See supra note 10 and accompanying text
(outlining the different ways pollen drift occurs).
108. See Genuity Bollgard II Cotton, GENUITY, http://www.genuity.com/cotton/Pages/
GenuityBollgardIICotton.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (asserting that Genuity Bollgard
II Cotton, manufactured by Monsanto, is the best Bt cotton plant at reducing damage by
cotton-eating worms); see also Glossary, supra note 2 (describing that Bt is naturally found
in soil, but Bt GM plants are designed to produce its fatal protein themselves).
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The bacterium has been trans-genetically inserted into the seeds in
order to kill certain insects and pests.109 There are additional GM
traits110 that change nutritional content and attempt to increase
yield111 in the plant. Regardless of which genetically modified traits a
seed contains, farmers using any patented seed from a patent holder,
such as Monsanto,112 DuPont,113 or Syngenta,114 must sign a limited
license to use the patented seeds; the limited license for Monsanto is
called the Master Technology/Stewardship Agreement (MTSA).115
The MTSA prohibits saving any seeds reproduced by the GM
plants.116 Saving seeds is a conventional farming practice that ensures
the continuation of the breed, sustainably provides seeds for the next
year’s crop, and also allows for genetic diversification of seeds to

109. See Glossary, supra note 2 (detailing how Bt kills insects by creating a protein
that harms their digestive systems); see also Cotton Seeds, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/cotton-seeds.aspx (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (noting that Genuity Bollgard II cotton seeds specifically protect the plants
from worms). Upland and Pima cotton, both genetically modified into Bt cotton
(referred to as Bollgard II) by Monsanto, are “mostly self-pollinated,” aside from rare
instances of cross-pollination through insects and wind. ROBERT B. HUTMACHER ET
AL., AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CALIFORNIA SERIES, PUB. NO. 8191, METHODS TO
ENABLE THE COEXISTENCE OF DIVERSE COTTON PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 1 (2006), available
at http://www.anrcatalog.ucdavis.edu/pdf/8191.pdf; see also MONSANTO, TUG 2013:
U.S. TECHNOLOGY USE GUIDE 13 (2013) [hereinafter TUG], available at
http://www.monsanto.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Technology-Use-Guide.pdf
(clarifying U.S. law on exporting and marketing Bt cotton due to different laws
regarding biotechnology).
110. Agricultural Seeds, supra note 104; see Glossary, supra note 2 (explaining that the
agricultural seed technology industry can now contain “stacked” traits combining
several modifications to a seed’s genetic makeup, such as drought resistance).
111. Do GM Crops Increase Yield, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/
Pages/do-gm-crops-increase-yield.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (“GM crops generally
have higher yields due to both breeding and biotechnology.”). But see INT’L ASSESSMENT
OF AGRIC. KNOWLEDGE, SCI. & TECH. FOR DEV., AGRICULTURE AT A CROSSROADS: GLOBAL
REPORT 95 (2008), available at http://www.agassessment.org/reports/IAASTD/EN/
Agriculture%20at%20a%20Crossroads_Global%20Report%20(English).pdf (finding that
the excessive costs and low yields of GM agriculture was outperformed by traditional agroecological farming practices).
112. See MTSA, supra note 7 (requiring all growers of Monsanto seeds to sign the
licensing agreement); see also Andrew Pollack, As Patent Ends, a Seed’s Use Will Survive,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at B3 (asserting that Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans
will be the first Bt plant to go public since the widespread use of biotechnology
began in the 1990s); Roundup Ready Soybean Patent Expiration, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/roundup-ready-patent-expiration.aspx
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining that Roundup trait will go off patent and
become available to the public in 2014).
113. Jack Kaskey, DuPont Sends in Former Cops To Enforce Seed Patents, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 28, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-28/dupontsends-in-former-cops-to-enforce-seed-patents-commodities.html.
114. SYNGENTA SEEDS, INC. STEWARDSHIP AGREEMENT (2009), available at
http://www.legendseeds.com/download/Syngenta_Stewardship_Agreement_2010.pdf.
115. See MTSA, supra note 7 (containing the subtitle “Limited Use License”).
116. Id.
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confront future problems.117 The MTSA also prohibits any future
use, sale, or receipt of the seeds.118 Additionally, the Center for Food
Safety reported cases where farmers were unaware of the terms of the
license agreement because they were never asked to sign a MTSA by
the intermediary salesman.119
But it is not the license alone that prohibits seed saving. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held in Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling,120 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,121 and Monsanto Co. v. Bowman122
that self-replicated GM seeds are protected by the patent as well.
Defendants argued that second generation seed should not have
patent protection due to the doctrine of patent exhaustion, which
establishes that the right to exclusively sell the patented product is
exhausted by a single, unrestricted sale of that product.123 The
doctrine also allows for modifications to the product.124 However, the
Federal Circuit found that both in cases where the sale was restricted
117. See INT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF FOOD & AGRIC., MANIFESTO ON THE FUTURE
6–8 (2006) [hereinafter MANIFESTO], available at http://www.arsia.toscana.it
/petizione/documents/semi/futurosemi_eng.pdf (proclaiming that preventing
farmers from saving and exchanging seeds, as they have historically done, is
detrimental not only to the agricultural way of life, but to food security); see also 7
U.S.C. § 2543 (2006) (allowing a seed saving exception under the PVPA); Van Pelt,
supra note 107, at 576 (stating that under the “saved-seed exemption,” farmers
could replant saved seeds from protected plants that were legally purchased and
planted on their own farms, although the scope of the “saved-seed exemption”
narrowed over time to include only the number of seeds sufficient to plant their
crop in the next season).
118. MTSA, supra note 7. The agreement further allows review of the farmer’s
U.S. Department of Agriculture-Farm Service Agency (USDA-FSA) crop report,
which permits Monsanto to view the farmer’s financial state. CFS REPORT, supra note
13, at 17 (explaining that access to the FSA form helps Monsanto identify
neighboring farms, determine how much seed the farmer bought, and determine
how many seeds the farmer planted). The company can also demand financial
receipts of purchased and sold seed to be handed over if it believes a farmer has
saved seed; farmers must release this financial information within seven days, and in
some cases a twenty-four hour turnaround is required. See TUG, supra note 109, at 2–
3 (declaring that if Monsanto has a “reasonable” belief that a farmer saves seeds, it
“may inspect and test” all of the farmer’s fields). The agreement contains a choice of
law provision and a forum selection clause requiring that any infringement lawsuits
be brought in the Eastern District of Missouri. MTSA, supra note 7. This clause only
applies to farmers who have signed the agreement and not to unsuspecting
neighbors who never purchased seed, but were victims of pollen drift. CFS REPORT,
supra note 13, at 44 (stating that Monsanto cannot enforce the terms of the
technology agreement when farmers have not signed it, though Monsanto may sue
the farmers for patent infringement).
119. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 44 (asserting that forged signatures on the
technology agreement are common).
120. 302 F.3d 1291, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
121. 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
122. 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011), No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013).
123. Supra notes 120–22; see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S.
617, 625 (2008) (defining patent exhaustion).
124. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
OF SEEDS
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by the license and where it was unrestricted, the patent still was not
exhausted by the self-replicated, second generation seed.125
C. GM Pollen Drift Contamination and Patent Infringement
Patents may be unintentionally infringed and the MTSA
inadvertently breached when pollen drift occurs. Pollen drift is the
cross-pollination of agricultural commodities and can be caused by
the movement of animals or shared equipment,126 by the wind
carrying plants and seeds to other farms and contaminating the
plants, or by planted, but dormant, seeds.127 Seeds can lie dormant in
a field for several years before sprouting; therefore, a field containing
previously licensed seeds can violate the patent years later once the
dormant seeds sprout.128 Only total replacement of the topsoil can
fully prevent dormant seeds from sprouting.129
Pollen drift occurs without any intent or action on behalf of the
alleged infringer.130 However, courts have refused to move away from
the strict liability standard of infringement.131 In some cases,
however, courts have considered intent when awarding damages.132
Even if intent is considered when awarding damages and the accused
farmer does not have to pay damages, the patent rights can still be
costly because the farmer is not awarded legal fees and must still
remove the contamination from his fields.133 Removal can leave the
125. Compare Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345, 1349 (finding no exhaustion where the
sale was unrestricted), with Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336 (finding no exhaustion where
the sale was restricted).
126. See The World According to Monsanto (ARTE France television broadcast Mar.
11, 2008), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6_DbVdVo-k (discussing
the potential endangerment of Mexico’s traditional corn growing region, Oaxaca,
because GM corn has contaminated parts of the region despite the illegality of
cultivation in the region). Experts believe that because under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, Mexico must permit GM corn from the United States to be
imported for consumption (not for agricultural use), discarded GM corn was simply
in the area and began growing. Id.
127. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds, & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 297 (2003).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 294 (asserting that when soil remains untilled, such as occurs in
prairies, canola seeds are likely to lie dormant for “six to ten years”).
130. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining that pollen drift from
GM plants is natural).
131. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Hartkamp, No. 00-164-P, 2001 WL 34079482, at *2
(E.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2001) (stipulating that intent is only taken into account to
determine increasing damages for “willful infringement”).
132. See Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(citing Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1073 (5th Cir. 1982)); Lam, Inc. v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 474–75 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Rantanen, supra
note 14, at 1605–09 (discussing damage awards affected by willful infringement).
133. See Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 105 (Can.)
(sustaining an injunctive order against the farmer from using Monsanto’s GM seeds);
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farmer without seed for the following years.134 More globally,
however, permitting infringement suits even when the court does not
award damages creates a system through which the high risk of using
conventional seeds and being sued due to unintended pollen drift
incentivizes farmers to use GM seeds.135
Already, some farmers are taking measures to protect against
contamination and potential infringement suits, which can cost tens
of thousands of dollars.136 Conventional farmers may take on the
burden of creating a buffer zone around their crops to prevent
pollen drift, attempt to rent machinery that does not also work with
GM seeds or has been thoroughly cleaned between uses, or take
other costly measures to prevent contamination.137 Nonetheless, even
these measures may be insufficient, as contamination may go
unnoticed for years and may occur over large geographic areas,138
meaning that many conventional seed companies can no longer
certify that their products are not GM contaminated.139 Yet the
burden for finding a market is always on the farmer—whether his
The burden to prevent
crop is contaminated or not.140
Aoki, supra note 127, at 297 (describing the costs of removing contamination from
fields, even though it is almost impossible to remove all contamination).
134. First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 38 (explaining that after
contamination removal, the affected field cannot be used for many years).
135. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 28–30 (emphasizing that Monsanto
threatens farmers with expensive and time consuming lawsuits, even when they have
little to no verifiable evidence of infringement, to pressure farmers into buying their
GM seeds); see also Van Pelt, supra note 107, at 583, 588–89 (analyzing the Coase
theorem, which posits that parties do not utilize the most beneficial and efficient
solutions due to the potential for legal fees and liability costs, to determine that
government regulation would be better than infringement lawsuits for ensuring the
allocation of costs onto the patent holder because of the varying risks of
unintentional cross-pollination).
136. See, e.g., CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 41 (offering the example of a North
Dakota farmer who spent a total of $12,200 in one year on prevention strategies after
spending around $200,000 on legal fees when Monsanto sued his farm in 2000).
137. See TUG, supra note 109, at 8 (stating that according to “accepted practice,”
farmers who grow non-GM crops should utilize borders and plan different growing
times to prevent unintentional cross-pollination).
138. See CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 39 (citing a British study that found oilseed
rape pollen could travel sixteen miles); Andrew Pollack, Can Biotech Crops Be Good
Neighbors?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at WK12 (stating that GM bentgrass seeds can
travel thirteen miles and cross-pollinate with other plants); supra note 127 and
accompanying text (noting that canola seeds may remain dormant for six to ten
years before germination).
139. See The “Non-GMO Project Verified” Seal, NON-GMO PROJECT,
http://www.nongmoproject.org/learn-more/understanding-our-seal (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013) (allowing 0.9% GM contamination in products certified as “NonGMO” verified, in accordance with European Union guidelines, because
contamination is unavoidable).
140. See TUG, supra note 109, at 8 (asserting that the grower of “Identity
Preserved” crops, such as organic or non-GM crops, must prevent them from being
contaminated).
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contamination also lies with the third party farmer instead of the
licensed seed user or patent holder; additionally, the cost of
attempting to prevent contamination is lower than the legal fees and
possible damages from an infringement lawsuit regardless of the
likelihood of contamination or a lawsuit.141
Illustrating the plight of the third party farmer is Organic Seed
Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto,142 a recently dismissed case from
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
case involved eighty-three plaintiffs, including organic farmers, seed
businesses, and farming associations, who sought a declaratory
judgment to prevent what they saw as inevitable infringement cases
The court
against them for unintentional contamination.143
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.144 First, the
district court accepted Monsanto’s assertion that it will not sue
farmers who are unintentionally contaminated with trace amounts of
its products, and second, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to
show that the 144 prior defendants sued by Monsanto were in like
circumstances to themselves, thereby holding that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a declaratory judgment.145 However, because intent is
not required under the Patent Act,146 Monsanto’s assertion that it will
not sue unintentional infringers does not mean that it cannot sue
unintentional infringers or that it would not prevail in such suits.147
D. Infringement Investigations, Settlements, and Lawsuits for Pollen Drift
GM seed companies often have strict patent and license
enforcement investigations and procedures.148 While most cases
settle out of court, settlements can often include a requirement that
the farmer purchase and use the patent holder’s seeds in the
future.149 Monsanto reports that it filed 144 lawsuits in the United
141. See, e.g., CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 19, 41; see also Van Pelt, supra note 107,
at 586–87.
142. 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), No. 12-1298 (Fed. Cir. argued Jan. 10, 2013).
143. Id. at 548–49.
144. Id. at 556.
145. Id. at 548.
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
147. See, e.g., Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C.
1968) (“It is, of course, elementary, that [a patent] infringement may be entirely
inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the patent.”).
148. See Farmers Reporting Farmers—Part 2, MONSANTO (Oct. 10, 2008),
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Farmers-Reporting-Farmers-Part2.aspx (discussing the procedures of the anonymous tip line and encouraging
farmers to report their neighbor farmers for breach of license or for patent
infringement).
149. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto’s Gene Police Raise Alarm on Farmers’
Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A1 (reporting that nearly half of
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States between 1997 and April 2010;150 this averages about thirteen
lawsuits per year.151 To date, only nine cases have gone to trial, and
all have ended in victory for Monsanto.152 Those farmers who do not
settle often face bankruptcy.153
Monsanto states that the company only pursues cases where it
believes the farmer has intentionally saved seed.154 However, the
question of intent is irrelevant for patent infringement, and farmers
who never signed a license agreement, but rather whose farm was
contaminated by pollen drift, may also be categorized as intentionally
saving seed if they harvest the contaminated crop and replant it the
following season.155 The strict liability of patent infringement is
traditionally justified by the recoup of investment funds in the
invention’s development and the requirement that the invention be
released into the public domain within twenty years.156
Harvesting and replanting seeds from contaminated crops was
exactly what defendant Percy Schmeiser had done in Monsanto
Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser,157 a case from the Supreme Court of
Canada.158 Schmeiser grew conventional canola, while five of his
neighboring farmers grew Roundup Ready canola, but through
pollen drift, his conventional crop was contaminated with GM
pollen.159 The season after his crop was contaminated, he planted a
new canola crop using seed saved from his contaminated harvest.160
the company’s 525 investigations had been settled); see also CFS REPORT, supra note
13, at 30 (explaining the strict and often confidential terms of such settlements).
150. Organic Seed Growers, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
151. Id.
152. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-whosave-seeds.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
153. CFS REPORT, supra note 13, at 42.
154. Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, supra note 152.
155. See, e.g., Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 87 (Can.).
156. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding that intent is required only if the patent holder seeks enhanced damages or
attorneys’ fees for willful infringement (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds,
520 U.S. 17 (1997))). But see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 833–34 (2002) (suggesting
patent law is actually a modified strict liability system where liability often depends
upon receipt of actual or constructive notice of the patent).
157. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
158. Canadian patent law is very similar to U.S. patent law. See Carie-Megan Flood,
Note, Pollen Drift and Potential Causes of Action, 28 J. CORP. L. 473, 476 (2003)
(analogizing the two bodies of law and finding that Monsanto’s licensing agreement
had similar applicability in both countries); cf. Aristech Chem. Int’l Ltd. v. Acrylic
Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 629 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting the similarity between the
Canadian and United States legal systems).
159. Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 5–6.
160. Id. at para. 61.
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Schmeiser’s routine spraying of Roundup herbicide to kill unwanted
weeds in the ditches alongside his fields revealed a large number of
Roundup-resistant canola plants.161 Schmeiser conducted testing and
found that approximately sixty percent of his plants were resistant to
Roundup herbicide.162 In the same growing season, an investigator
from Monsanto took seeds from near Schmeiser’s fields.163 Tests on
these samples revealed a significant amount of Roundup resistance.164
Monsanto sued Schmeiser in 1998 for infringement of its Canadian
patent on the Roundup Ready gene, alleging Schmeiser had grown
and sold canola plants containing the gene without a license or
consent.165 Though Schmeiser’s crop was contaminated through
pollen drift, he did sell the contaminated canola and even saved and
replanted the Roundup seeds, just as he would have done with his
conventional crop in the following growing season.166 He alleged,
that he did not however, use Roundup spray on the contaminated
crop and thus, did not benefit from the GM seed containing the
Roundup Ready gene.167 On the issue of infringement, the Supreme
Court of Canada168 determined it was irrelevant whether Schmeiser
intended to use or even benefit from the patented gene and thus
applied the strict liability doctrine. When assessing damages, the
court did hold that Schmeiser had not financially profited from the
harvesting of the crop grown from the patented technology and did
not require Schmeiser to pay any damages to Monsanto, despite the
finding of patent infringement.169
However, he still incurred

161. Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2003] 2 F.C. 165, para. 22 (Can.), aff’d,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
162. Id.
163. Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 6, 63.
164. Id.
165. Id. at para 1.
166. Id. at para. 63.
167. Id. at para. 81.
168. Compare Ridout & Maybee LLP, Canada, in MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF
APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE MARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 23,
23 (Arnold & Siedsma eds., Supp. 2012) (excluding intent when defining Canadian
patent infringement as “making, constructing, using or selling” any patented
invention within Canada during the term of the patent), with Kenyon & Kenyon,
USA, in MANUAL FOR THE HANDLING OF APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADE
MARKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, supra, at 30, 30 (excluding intent when defining
U.S. patent infringement as making, using, offering to sell, selling or importing any
patented invention within the U.S. during the term of the patent).
169. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, paras. 104–05; see also id. at para. 87
(questioning why Schmeiser chose to harvest the Roundup Ready plants he found on
his land, save the seeds, and plant them the next year). If courts were to continue
this model of paying for infringement when and if benefits are incurred, it would be
more costly and easier to use in other situations such as contamination by product
lines that feature higher yielding corn. In contrast, for Roundup Ready crops,
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significant costs, as he was required to pay legal fees, to rip up his
land to remove the seeds, and thus to lose that year’s income and
seeds for future years.170
II. POLLEN DRIFT DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR A RESTRICTION IN
PATENT RIGHTS BECAUSE THE SELF-REPLICATING INVENTION CAUSES
THE INFRINGEMENT
When utility patents were created, life was not patentable.171 There
were no lab-rat patents172 or reproducing seed patents.173 Now that
self-replicating organisms174 are patentable, the question of whether
enforcement rights are appropriate in all circumstances remains.175
This is particularly pressing in situations where the patented subject
itself has caused the infringement with no human interaction, or
when the infringement simultaneously arises in connection with
illegal acts such as trespass or nuisance attributable to the patent
holder. Moreover, an alternative means to patent law should be

benefits are only incurred if the farmer uses Roundup herbicide. See supra note 105
(explaining the Roundup system).
170. However, when Schmeiser’s land was contaminated again several years later,
he removed the contamination and sued Monsanto for the cost of removal and for
trespass. See Percy Schmeiser Turns the Tables on Monsanto, ISLAND TIDES, Apr. 3, 2008, at
3, available at http://www.islandtides.com/assets/reprint/env_20080403.pdf. The
company settled with him for the cost of removal, approximately $600. Id.
171. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property
Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for
Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 88, 99 (1995) (describing the expansion of
patent law to include plants in 1930 and animals in 1988); see also Stephanie M.
Bernhardt, High Plains Drifting: Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual Property
Implications of the GMO Revolution, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 12 (2005) (“The
unique nature of a property that can contaminate the property of others and
reproduce on its own was not considered by lawmakers when they drafted the Patent
Act.”).
172. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 171, at 99 (crediting the “Harvard mouse” of
1988 as the first multi-cellular living organism to be patented); see also U.S. Patent
No. 4,736,866 col. 2 l. 30–42, col. 3 l. 16–48 (filed June 22, 1984) (describing the
“Harvard Mouse,” or “OncoMouse,” as an animal genetically altered to be more
susceptible to cancer, making it ideal for cancer research).
173. See Joe Miller, Patent Law: How Patents Grew Over Time To Include Living
Organisms, COOKING UP A STORY, http://cookingupastory.com/patent-law-howpatents-grew-over-time-to-include-living-organisms (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
(outlining the development of patent law and its incorporation of reproducing seed
patents in the PVPA of 1970).
174. Referring to seed technology, but also including patented animals,
bacteria, and even DNA molecules. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that
DNA molecules separated by geneticists are patentable technology under 35
U.S.C. § 101), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 12-398).
175. Bernhardt, supra note 171, at 12 (arguing that the strict liability standard
applied to infringement of intellectual property is not appropriate in the context of
tangible property).
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found to manage any benefits inadvertently received from the pollen
drift such as resistance to pathogens.176
This Section first argues that because the self-replicating organism
through pollen drift itself has caused the infringement, a restriction
of patent rights is warranted in order to reconcile moral utility with
specific and substantial utility. Second, this Section borrows the legal
doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio from contract law to assert
that unlawful trespass attributable to the patent holder would
prohibit him or her from seeking a cause of action for patent
infringement.
Third, this Section addresses an unintentional
infringer benefiting from the infringement and explains why
enforcing patent rights for pollen drift is harmful to biodiversity and
the economy.
A. When Self-Replicating Inventions Themselves Cause Infringement and
Injury, the Patent Holder’s Exclusion Rights Should Be Restricted in Order To
Reconcile the Three Types of Utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Under the current application of the § 101 usefulness requirement
and Chakrabarty, it is clear that GM seeds are patentable and pollen
drift results in unintentional infringement on behalf of the farmer
whose crops are contaminated. Although the Court in Chakrabarty
held that living organisms merited no new test for patentability,177 the
unique self-replicating ability to cause infringement without any
human interaction should warrant a restriction of exclusion rights in
order to reconcile the three types of utility.
In Fuller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nearly
voided Justice Story’s moral utility test.178 The Fuller court held that as
long as the invention is capable of some use that is not harmful, it is
patentable.179 The decisions in Brenner and Fisher further specified
patentable utility as being specific and substantial.180 The Supreme
Court in Brenner held that looking to harm alone was insufficient
because there are some inventions, which are not positively harmful,
but are still not useful; thus, passing the injurious branch of the
moral utility test (as qualified by Fuller) was necessary but not
sufficient.181
176. Infra Part II.C.
177. Id. at 315.
178. Fuller v. Baker, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903).
179. Id.
180. Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519, 534–36 (1966); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also MPEP § 2107 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf.
181. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 533 (stating that there are “many things in this world
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However, even inventions having only injurious utility are now
eligible for patents.182 Since the Fuller decision, inventions only
capable of being used to deceive the public and inventions only
capable of being used to commit an illegal activity have been granted
patents.183 With regard to “deceptive” patents, the moral utility test
has been virtually eliminated.184 The Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip,
Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.185 held in part that a beverage dispenser that
concealed the mixing elements while displaying a fake pre-mixed
reservoir was patentable despite its deceptive nature.186 The court
likened the device to cubic zirconium and synthetic fabrics to reason
that the ability for one product to imitate another was itself a benefit
sufficient to satisfy utility.187 In addition to issuing patents for devices
useful only for deception, the USPTO has issued several patents for
devices useful only for committing illegal acts (illegal device
patents).188
The holding of Juicy Whip is inapplicable to self-replicating
patented organisms because it dealt with the “deceptive” branch of
moral utility, whereas self-replicating organisms are capable of injury
instead of deception.189 However, the rationale behind Fuller and the
illegal device patents is also inapposite for self-replicating patents
despite dealing with the injurious branch of moral utility. Both the
invention in Fuller and the illegal devices are inanimate objects
incapable of injuring without human intervention, whereas selfreplicating inventions can injure on their own.190 While moral utility
has been applied to deceptive, morally objectionable, and illegal
inventions, the Juicy Whip court only refused to apply it for deceptive
inventions.191 Self-replicating inventions are not meant to deceive the
public the way that the reservoir bowl in Juicy Whip was meant to
deceive customers.192 Instead, as with pollen drift, self-replicating
which may not be considered ‘useful’ but which, nevertheless, are totally without a
capacity for harm”).
182. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
184. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1356–66 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
185. 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
186. Id. at 1356–66.
187. Id. at 1367.
188. Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
189. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1364.
190. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 57, at 365 (describing patents issued for alcohol
production during prohibition, drug paraphernalia, radar detectors, and cockfighting equipment, all items that only cause harm when used by a person).
191. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367–68.
192. Id. (describing that the juice dispenser at issue was deceptive because it
displayed liquid in a reservoir bowl that was not actually the beverage dispensed to
customers).

LYND.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

GONE WITH THE WIND

2/28/2013 1:15 PM

687

patented organisms are capable of injury by breaking the law without
any human interaction.193 Thus, the holding in Juicy Whip does not
apply to self-replicating inventions.
Like Juicy Whip, the criminal invention patents and the Fuller
holding are also distinguishable when applied to self-replicating
technology.194 The rationale used to justify the granting of patents
for banned inventions and inventions capable only of being used for
illegal activity are inapplicable here.195 When self-replicating patents
cause infringement, the line between the patented invention and its
use disappears because the invention is acting on its own.196 For
example, while banned drug paraphernalia requires a user to commit
an illegal act, such as use or possession, self-replicating technology by
its very nature and existence can itself cause an illegal act such as
when the pollen produced by the patented seeds trespasses onto the
property of a third party.197 Without a distinction between the
invention and its use, the rationale for illegal device patents is
inapplicable to self-replicating patented organisms capable of causing
injury.
Even if deceptive and illegal inventions were not patentable when
they are only capable of injurious use, the holding from Fuller would
still permit them if they had some other use besides injuriousness.198
But like patents only capable of illegal use, the Fuller court’s rationale
is also inapposite for self-replicating technology.199 By using the
example of “Colt’s revolver,” the court in Fuller explained that an
invention might in fact be injurious to morals by promoting revenge,
to health by causing wounds or homicide, and to the good order of
society by increasing “private warfare.”200 However, the court went
further to state, “[o]n the other hand, the revolver, by furnishing a
ready means of self-defense, may sometimes have promoted morals

193. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text (describing the uncontrollable
nature of pollen drift).
194. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (holding that a product
can be patented if it has legal uses); Schwartz, supra note 57, at 365 (describing
patented inventions that have criminal uses).
195. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (describing the principle that a
patent does not grant a right to use a device, but only to prevent others from using it).
196. The seeds themselves are creating a second generation, so in effect the seeds
are infringing the patent, and not the farmer who owns the land in which they grow.
197. Supra note 193; see also Pollen—Nature’s Tiny Clues, ARIZ. STATE UNIV.,
http://askabiologist.asu.edu/podcasts/pollen-natures-tiny-clues (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (explaining that most pollen can travel 300 meters, but there are cases where
pollen was found 2000 miles from its source).
198. Fuller, 120 F. at 275.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 275–76.
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and health and good order.”201 Such conflicting results are possible
in nearly any inanimate invention that may be manipulated by
human beings. In nearly all situations, the revolver will require a
person’s will or even a person’s negligence in order to be used to
cause wounds or to be a means of self-defense as the court implied.202
The Fuller holding involved an inanimate object requiring human
manipulation in order to be injurious; therefore, the holding nearly
vacates the injurious branch of the moral utility test because
inanimate objects will almost always have some capacity to be used for
non-injurious purposes.
The Fuller test, however, does not address the circumstances of selfreplicating inventions. Even though GM seeds are capable of
growing food—a useful purpose—they are also capable of causing
trespass and nuisance.203 But, unlike with Colt’s revolver, a farmer
does not decide to plant GM seeds for food, and then decide to use
pollen created from the GM seeds to contaminate another’s property
or break the law.204 Instead, the seeds themselves cause injury, with
Thus, Fuller’s test does not fully
no human interaction.205
accommodate the distinct circumstances of self-replicating inventions
and should not be applied.
The Fuller opinion was a way of reconciling the injurious branch of
the moral utility test206 with the substantial and specific utility tests.207
If the Fuller opinion is not applicable to self-replicating patented
organisms, then a new form of reconciling the injurious branch of
moral utility and specific and substantial utility is needed when the
invention itself causes the infringement. One solution is to continue
applying the current test of at least one specific and substantial use
for patentability as well as the injurious branch of the moral utility
test without Fuller’s narrowing when a self-replicating patented
organism acts without human interaction such as during pollen drift.
201. Id.
202. While accidental discharge and other inadvertent harmful uses may occur,
the Fuller court was clearly implying that human use and will controls the object. See
id. (implying that the Colt’s revolver can be used for good or evil based on the will of
the person holding it).
203. See infra notes 213–39 and accompanying text (describing potential injuries
associated with pollen drift).
204. See, e.g., Bernhardt, supra note 171, at 6 (describing the various ways that
seeds from plants growing on one farmer’s land can travel to another farmer’s land
outside the control of either farmer).
205. Id.
206. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass.
1817) (No. 8568) (laying out the injurious branch of the moral utility test).
207. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (requiring substantial
utility and a specific benefit).
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Doing so would mean the patent would only be unenforceable when
it fails moral utility but would remain enforceable in all other
situations, thanks to its specific and substantial utility. This would
allow inventions such as GM seeds to maintain their patent because
they are specifically and substantially useful in growing food, for
example.208 But it would also expressly limit patent rights when a selfreplicating patent becomes injurious without human interaction.209
Thus, because of the injurious branch of the moral utility test, the
patent holder would have no patent enforcement rights when (1) the
patented technology causes the infringement with no human
interaction and (2) the infringing act fails the (pre-Fuller) moral
utility test. Carving out patent rights in such a situation would
accommodate self-replicating technology under moral utility and
under specific and substantial utility. Moreover, these limited patent
rights would leave intact the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Scruggs and
McFarling, where the GM seed patent infringement occurred because
of self-replication but was not injurious.210 In those cases, the
infringer saved seed from a previously licensed patent-protected crop,
in order to replant it, instead of being injured by self-replicating seed
through pollen drift that caused a trespass or nuisance.211 Thus, the
infringement did occur because of self-replication (first prong), but
did not fail the injurious branch of the moral utility test in
infringement (second prong).212 Therefore, the patent holder would
be able to enforce patent rights when a farmer saves seed after
licensing the seed from the patent holder.
In the case of GM seeds, there are several forms of injury that can
occur by the very nature of the patented seed and the natural
phenomenon of pollen drift.213 First, the pollen can cause nuisance
208. See, e.g., WADE A. GIVENS ET AL., ROUNDUP READY CROPS HAVE MAJOR POSITIVE IMPACT
ON TILLAGE PRACTICES (2009), available at http://www.monsanto.com/weedmanagement
/Documents/Benchmark-TillageSummaryRept2.pdf (describing some benefits of
Monsanto’s patented seed technology).
209. See, e.g., Bernhardt, supra note 171, at 6 (describing the potential harm done
to a neighboring farmer’s crops from the introduction of genetic material carried in
airborne pollen originating from a Monsanto derived plant).
210. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (illustrating
that the defendant purchased Monsanto seeds, yet did not sign a license agreement
preventing his subsequent reuse of the resulting second generation seeds);
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (revealing that the
defendant saved seeds generated from the first generation of planted Monsanto
seeds and then planted them the following season, contrary to the license
agreement).
211. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333; McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293.
212. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333 (noting that the GM seed was purchased not
contaminated); McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293 (same).
213. Flood, supra note 158, at 474 n.7, 475–76 (suggesting “[p]laintiffs may
utilize . . . legal theories, such as trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability for
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because it interferes with the “private use and enjoyment” of
property.214 For example, in Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co.,215 the
Iowa Supreme Court held that erection of a cement plant constituted
a private nuisance because the dust, noise and smell of the plant had
“changed the neighborhood for the worse.”216 Thus, wind-blown
cement dust landing on another’s property is sufficient to constitute
a nuisance, legally harming the victim.217 Similarly, wind-blown
pollen landing on another’s property also creates a legally actionable
nuisance claim.218
Second, the pollen can cause a physical trespass because it
interferes with the possessory rights of property by entering another’s
land.219 Trespass can occur even when a person does not enter
another’s land.220 It is sufficient that one causes a third person or
thing to do so.221 Additionally, the trespass need not be intentional;
the trespasser need only be aware that there is a high probability that
his or her activity will result in trespass.222 Thus, there is liability for
trespass where the trespass was negligent or the result of abnormally
dangerous activity.223 Finally, the pollen that drifts can destroy the
landowner’s possessions by contaminating their crops and soil.224
abnormally dangerous activities, to recover damages for injury caused by genetic
drift”).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (defining “liability for a
private nuisance if, but only if, [one’s] conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a)
intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under
the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities” (emphasis added)).
215. 214 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1974).
216. Id. at 129.
217. Id.
218. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (“Residue from a product drifting across property lines presents a typical
nuisance claim.”); Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and the
Prevention of “Genetic Pollution”: Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,328, 10,329 (2000) (outlining the various harms that can occur to farmers due to
pollen drift of GM crops).
219. See Flood, supra note 158, at 482 (comparing an example from the Second
Restatement that “one who so piles sand close to his boundary that by force of gravity
alone it slides down onto his neighbor’s land . . . becomes a trespasser on the other’s
land” to pollen drift where there is substantial certainty that like gravity moving the
sand, the wind will blow the pollen onto a nearby property (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965))).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. b (indicating that trespass may
include “the presence upon the land of a third person or thing which the actor has
caused to be or to remain there”).
221. Id. § 158 cmt. i (indicating that trespass may include “throwing, propelling,
or placing” a thing on, above, or below the land).
222. 16 DAVID K. DEWOLF, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: TORT LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 13.31, at 408–09 (3d ed. 2006).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (“One who recklessly or negligently,
or as a result of an abnormally dangerous activity, enters land in the possession of
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Pollen bears many similarities to other types of particulate
matter that have a known tendency to drift. In Bradley v. American
Smelting & Refining Co.,225 a smelting company did not deny that
whenever the smelter was in operation, the “whim of the winds”
could deposit its emissions, including arsenic and cadmium, onto the
plaintiff’s land.226
The pollen drift from GM seeds, often considered contamination
by neighboring farmers, contains similar elements of trespass.
Additional injuries include the receiving farmer losing the actual
value of his or her crops, the farmer being unable or unwilling to find
a market to sell the GM crops, or the receiving farmer being legally
barred from selling them due to patent infringement.227 Just as with
pollen drift, in Bradley there was a known high-probability that wind
would move unwanted particulate matter from the defendant’s land
to the plaintiff’s land, resulting in trespass.228 Although the seed
industry often refers to contamination as “adventitious presence,”229
suggesting contamination occurred by chance, it is not by chance that
organisms reproduce, it is inherent.230 Moreover, the contamination
destroys the product the farmer intended to grow and in some cases
of contamination, despite genetic modification, there is no
“advantage” to the receiving farmer such as a higher crop yield or
undisturbed use of a glyphosate herbicide (like Roundup) on the
crop.231 Furthermore, because conventional farmers save seeds from

another or causes a thing or third person so to enter is subject to liability to the
possessor if, but only if, his presence or the presence of the thing or the third person
upon the land causes harm to the land, to the possessor, or to a thing or a third
person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.”).
224. See Julie A. Davies & Lawrence C. Levine, Biotechnology’s Challenge to the Law of
Torts, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 221, 223–24 (2000) (arguing that trespass is possible for
pollen drift in the biotechnology context); Redick & Bernstein, supra note 218.
225. 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985).
226. Id. at 785.
227. Stephanie E. Cox, Note, Genetically Modified Organisms: Who Should Pay the
Price for Pollen Drift Contamination?, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 401, 405, 407 (2008).
228. Id.
229. See Glossary, supra note 2 (defining adventitious presence as “unintended,
trace levels of traits developed through modern plant biotechnology in seed, grain,
or feed and food products”).
230. See MANIFESTO, supra note 117, at 10 (indicating that the nature of seed is to
reproduce itself and multiply). This is particularly true in regard to GM plants
evidenced by studies that suggest that certain GM crops are more likely to crosspollinate than non-GM crops. Cox, supra note 227, at 405.
231. See, e.g., Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, para. 9 (Can.)
(finding no benefit to using the GM seeds because the farmer did not use them in
conjunction with the corresponding herbicide).
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their crop for future replanting,232 crop contamination in one
growing season contaminates the genetic makeup of that crop’s
offspring, the seeds that the farmer would be using for future
growing seasons.233 Worse yet, the genetic contamination can stay in
the seed’s genome for fifteen years.234
Finally, a farm certified as organic or GM-free may lose its
certification and its market once contaminated by GM pollen.235 For
example, the European Union requires labeling of GM food
products; if a farmer’s crops are not labeled, they cannot sell to that
market, but the farm also cannot label their crops without paying the
license fee to the patent holder, despite being contaminated through
no fault of the farmer.236
Even if the patent holder were to offer to remove contaminated
crops, the farmer would have lost his sellable crop for the year and
the cost of seeds.237 The plethora of individual harms are the result
of the self-replicating nature of the invention—the very invention
that continues to be granted protection despite causing injury.238

232. Farmers Protest Loss of Saving Seed, DELTA FARM PRESS (Apr. 6, 2001),
http://deltafarmpress.com/farmers-protest-loss-saving-seed (“As long as farmers
have tilled soil, they have saved seed for their own use . . . .”).
233. Rhea Gala, GM Contamination Accelerating: No Co-Existence Possible, INST. OF SCI.
IN SOC’Y (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.i-sis.org.uk/GMCANCEP.php (indicating that
the contamination of a seed stays within its genome, thereby affecting the seed’s
offspring).
234. GEOFF SQUIRE ET AL., SCOTTISH CROP RESEARCH INST., THE POTENTIAL FOR
OILSEED RAPE FERAL (VOLUNTEER) WEEDS TO CAUSE IMPURITIES IN LATER OILSEED RAPE
CROPS 10 (2003), available at http://www.scri.ac.uk/scri/file/EPI/Agroecology/
Volunteer_impurities_in_oilseed_rape_rg0114.pdf (finding that that GM canola can
contaminate non-GM varieties for fifteen years).
235. First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 36; Flood, supra note 158, at 476
(discussing the loss of Mathew Kraft’s organic corn certification due to pollen drift
from GM corn); Flood, supra note 158, at 490 (“Currently no private or
governmental certification program for organic food allows use of GMO seeds.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Redick & Bernstein, supra note 218, at
10,329 (explaining that when non-GM farmers ship GM contaminated products to
GM-free countries, their crops are rejected and labeled “unmarketable by the
comingling of a single variety of GMO that is not approved for import to the EU or
other major trading partners”).
236. See The World According to Monsanto, supra note 126 (discussing with Brazilian
ministers how the Brazilian market had mysteriously become contaminated with GM
soy causing exports to Europe to be rejected and how that played a role in Brazil
legalizing GM seeds).
237. See supra note 170 (explaining how Schmeiser sued for the cost of later
contamination removal and Monsanto settled for the cost of removal); see also Aoki,
supra note 127, at 297 (discussing how an individual whose crops were contaminated
with the pollen from GM seeds was required to dig up his land and lost all his seeds,
with no offer to replace the seeds or compensate the farmer).
238. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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B. Courts Should Not Enforce Patent Rights when Infringment Arises from
Unlawful Trespass or Nuisance Caused by the Self-Replicating Patented
Organism
Applying ex turpi causa oritur non actio, courts have held that the test
for whether a demand connected with an illegal action is enforceable
is whether the plaintiff requires any aid from the illegal transaction to
establish his case.239 In many cases, this means that the cause of
action and the illegal action were based on the same facts.240
Similarly, in a patent infringement suit for pollen drift, the applicable
facts to infringement are the same as those that show nuisance or
trespass on the part of the patent holder. For example, in Sirkin v.
Fourteenth St. Store,241 a hosiery distributer sued a buyer over the price
of hosiery delivered.242 The buyer brought a defense that the seller
had obtained the contract by bribing the buyer’s purchasing agent in
violation of a New York statute making bribery a misdemeanor.243
The appellate court held the contract unenforceable because it
conflicted with “the public policy of the state, [and] it is the duty of
the court to be guided thereby in administering the law.”244 The
same is true in pollen drift: nuisance and trespass evidence the
public policy of the state, and as such, the court should not uphold a
patent causing a trespass or nuisance.
The doctrine of ex turpi causa seeks to protect the greater
population from the harms that can result from encouraging illegal
acts. In Veazey v. Allen,245 the New York Court of Appeals further
clarified the purpose of the ex turpi causa doctrine by noting that it is
intended for the protection of society in general and not for the
protection of litigants.246 Therefore, in an action between the parties
to a fraudulent scheme, it is no defense that the victim is satisfied
with the bargain and is initially benefitted by the plaintiff’s fraud.247
Courts have further justified the doctrine as a deterrence of illegal

239. See, e.g., Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143, 149 (1883) (“If . . . the cause of action
appear[s] to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country,
then the court says he has no right to be assisted.”). But see Ingram v. Mitchell, 30
Ga. 547, 550 (1860) (holding that “whenever the plaintiff can make out his case
without invoking the illegal contract to his aid, he is entitled to recover”).
240. Ewell, 108 U.S. at 149 (indicating courts will not assist a plaintiff whose cause
of action arises from illegal acts).
241. 108 N.Y.S. 830 (App. Div. 1908).
242. Id. at 831.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 833–34.
245. 66 N.E. 103 (N.Y. 1903).
246. Id. at 107–08.
247. Id. at 105–07.
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conduct248 and the preservation of respect for the rule of law.249 This
perspective could be particularly valuable for pollen drift, which not
only harms the victim, but the public food supply as well.250 In In re
Starlink Corn Products Liability Litigation,251 GM corn that had been
approved only for animal consumption was unknowingly released
into the human food supply via pollen drift.252 Only after products
such as corn tortillas were sent to restaurants and super markets did
testing reveal their GM contamination; massive product recalls
followed.253
While patenting seed does not break the law as an illegal contract
does, the effects of self-replication, such as pollen drift, can cause
violations of the laws prohibiting trespass, nuisance, and the strict
liability negligence for an abnormally dangerous activity.254 Thus, to
enforce patent rights that treat pollen drift as an infringement and
overlook the violations caused by the drift would “sully[] the
machinery of justice.”255 The doctrine should be extended to patent
infringement suits because the rationales that apply it to other fields
of law are applicable and necessary in patent law. Once the specific
illegal or tortious circumstance occurs, the right to sue for patent
infringement is in conflict with the right to be free of trespass,
nuisance, or negligence.256 Just as enforcing the right to contract for
248. See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669–70 (1899) (asserting that when
parties understand that when they enter into contracts of this nature they place
themselves outside the protection of the law that consists of aiding them to enforce
such contracts, then the less inclined they will be to enter into such contracts); see
also Sirken, 108 N.Y.S. at 834 (“I think nothing will be more effective in stopping the
growth and spread of this corrupting and now criminal custom [of commercial
bribery] than a decision that the courts will refuse their aid to a guilty vendor or
vendee . . . .”).
249. Prentice, supra note 68, at 106–22 (setting forth courts’ justifications for the
doctrine).
250. Infra Part II.C.
251. 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
252. Id. at 834–35, 841.
253. See Melinda Fulmer, Taco Bell Recalls Shells that Used Bioengineered Corn, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/23/news/mn-25314
(estimating the recall of Taco Bell taco shells cost Kraft food roughly $50 million).
254. See Flood, supra note 158, at 474–76 (suggesting “trespass, nuisance,
negligence, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities” as claims against
pollen drift).
255. See Prentice, supra note 68, at 60, 119 (noting that a court’s ruling allowing
criminals to profit from their crime would “sully the court’s reputation”); see also
Manning v. Noa, 76 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. 1956) (“Our doors are open to both the
virtuous and the villainous. We do not, however, lend our aid to the furtherance of
an unlawful project, nor do we decide, as between two scoundrels, who cheated
whom the more.”).
256. Compare In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (concluding
that “[t]he patent right is [really] a right to exclude”), with Church of Christ in
Hollywood v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 817 (Ct. App. 2002)
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an illegal act would violate contracting principles, allowing patent
enforcement for circumstances such as pollen drift undermines the
ex turpi causa doctrine. Protecting the interest of society requires
both preserving respect for the law and deterring tortious conduct by
refusing to lend the law’s aid to tortfeasors.257
Additionally,
application of the ex turpi causa doctrine would encourage patent
holders to require precautionary measures preventing pollen drift
and deter patent holders from seeking to gain from the victims of
pollen drift.
The effect of a contractual illegality under the ex turpi causa
doctrine is generally that the courts refuse to aid either party.258
While some courts have stated that illegal contracts are void from
their inception, the effect may more accurately be described as
“simply leav[ing] the parties . . . where the court finds them.”259
Alternatively, a court may mitigate the damage by holding that only
part of the agreement is enforceable.260 Such divisibility entails
separating a contract into pairs of corresponding consideration and
performance, and then enforcing only the part of the agreement that
does not materially advance the improper purpose.261 Similarly,
applying ex turpi causa to patent infringement cases would not
completely invalidate the patent; it would only make the patent rights
unenforceable when illegal circumstances were present. Just as the
court may enforce only parts of a contract that do not support an
illegality,262 the court should enforce a patent holder’s right to
exclude only when the patent is not causing the violation of laws that
prohibit nuisance or trespass. Specifically, causing such a violation is
not equal to the mere capability of being used by a human to commit

(“[L]andowners . . . have a right to exclude [others] from trespassing on private
property . . . .” (quoting Allred v. Harris, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 533 (Ct. App. 1993))).
257. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (explaining that the court will
deny rights to those whose actions appear to arise ex turpi causa).
258. See Prentice, supra note 68, at 61 & n.46 (noting that this often means that
one party profits unjustly at the expense of the other).
259. Id.
260. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 3–4 (3d ed. 2004).
261. Id. § 5.8, at 88. For example, in Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y.
1971), a covenant for an oral surgeon not to practice “dentistry and/or oral surgery”
was held void as to dentistry but enforceable as to oral surgery. Id. at 754–56.
Attempting to exclude both professions violated the law that “a man [cannot] be
excluded from a profession for which he has been trained when he does not
compete with his former employer by practicing it.” Id.
262. Compare Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 969–70 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding a contract void and unenforceable because illegal portions were not
severable), with Coolidge Co. v. Mokrynski, 472 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D.N.Y 1979)
(enforcing a covenant to the extent that it was reasonable by severing “the
impermissible from the valid”).
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a crime or an illegal act, as with “Colt’s revolver,”263 but rather, as with
pollen drift, involves no human interaction.
While only natural or legal persons are capable of violating the law,
patented organisms may cause persons to violate the law when they
self-replicate. An illegal act caused by pollen drift should be directly
attributed to the holder of the patent and not the licensee.264 Sole
liability should lie with the patent holder because pollen drift victims
often cannot be certain of the pollen’s origin, so there may be no
other farmer to sue.265 Moreover, Monsanto has previously settled
with farmers over the cost of removal after contamination and has
offered to remove contamination in certain circumstances, essentially
linking their patent ownership to the pollen drift.266
The link between the patent holder and the self-replicated seed has
also been established by the Federal Circuit via the doctrine of patent
exhaustion.267 Although saving self-replicated seed after having
licensed GM seed is distinct from having one’s crops be
contaminated by GM seed, each is equally considered to be patent
infringement under current law. In both seed saving and pollen
drift, the patented item self-replicates.268 In McFarling and Scruggs,
both defendants were sued for infringement because they saved the
seeds that were reproduced from the patented seed.269 However,
Scruggs and McFarling purchased seed from Monsanto under the
actual or implied condition that they not save reproduced seed, then
saved and replanted the reproduced seed and were found to be
infringing the patent.270 They each argued that the doctrine of
patent exhaustion applied and that the patent did not extend to the
reproduced seed.271 The Federal Circuit twice disagreed and stated
in Scruggs, that “[w]ithout the actual sale of the second generation
263. Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903).
264. Most genetic seeds are licensed, not sold. See MTSA, supra note 7 (licensing
seeds only); see also Van Pelt, supra note 107, at 579 (arguing that “trespass is not a
defense against the infringement” but an “after-the-fact solution”).
265. Jane Matthews Glenn, Footloose: Civil Responsibility for GMO Gene Wandering in
Canada, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 547, 555 (2004) (pointing out that if multiple transgenic
crops are grown by different farmers around the alleged infringer’s field, it may be
difficult to prove the source of the nuisance).
266. Supra note 170.
267. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(permitting patent holder rights, as established in a license, to extend to second
generation seed), No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
459 F.3d 1328, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (same).
268. See supra Part I.D.
269. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333 (charging that the defendant saved seeds, contrary
to a license agreement); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293–94 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (same).
270. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333; McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293–94.
271. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335; McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1298.
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seed . . . there can be no patent exhaustion. The fact that a patented
technology can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to
use replicated copies of the technology.”272 This is very different from
Farmer A purchasing patented seed, then that seed contaminating
Farmer B’s crops through pollen drift, which is a stage of selfreplication. Although pollen drift and seed saving are distinct, these
seed saving cases guide the issue of liability in pollen drift cases
because they both involve the prohibited use of self-replicated seed.
The Federal Circuit’s holdings in McFarling, Scruggs, and Bowman that
patent exhaustion does not apply to using self-replicated seed
indicates that the patent holder retains complete rights to the selfreplicated seed that drift onto an unsuspecting farmer’s land. 273
The Federal Circuit extended patent rights, and thus, the
connection between patent holder and self-replicated seed, in
Bowman,274 even where the defendant had not saved licensed seed,
but purchased reproduced seed from a grain elevator that was under
no license.275 Those circumstances are also distinct from having one’s
crop contaminated by pollen drift.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s holding in any and all of the
three cases that the patent holder has perpetual control over seeds
that have self-replicated276 strengthens the idea that the patent
holder, and not the licensee, should be held liable to any illegal acts
caused by the self-replicating nature of the patented seed. Because
the patent holder has the benefit of retaining the rights to the second
generation seed, it follows that the patent holder should then be held
liable for the second generation seed.
C. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Pollen Drift to the “Infringer” Should Be
Dealt with Outside of Patent Law
Proponents of utility patents for self-replicating technology may
argue that even if the infringement is unintentional, the infringer
could in some cases benefit from it.277 In cases where pollen drift has
272. Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336.
273. The Supreme Court heard arguments in Bowman as this Comment went to
print. As such, the Court’s decision may affect this point.
274. 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), No. 11-796 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013).
275. Id. at 1347–48.
276. See id. (permitting patent holder rights to extend to second generation seed);
Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1335–36 (same); McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1298–99 (same).
277. This might apply to someone who may realize that GM seeds are on their
land and then use the corresponding herbicide to create a higher yield. See, e.g.,
Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2003] 2 F.C. 165, para. 2 (Can.) (explaining the
trial court’s reasoning that the farmer knew of the contamination and intentionally
saved seed), aff’d, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). But it would not apply, for example, to
an organic farmer who is harmed by the contamination. See First Amended
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caused injury through self-replication of the patented organism and
the receiving farmer does not remove the product (and infringement
is not found under this test), the court may need to decide whether
the farmer should be allowed to benefit from the trespass.278 Not
only is it appropriate to prohibit patent infringement cases in these
instances, it is appropriate to place the burden of preventing harm
on the patent holder.279
The two doctrines that support burden-shifting to the licensees are
the wandering bull doctrine and acquisition by find. The wandering
bull doctrine holds that if a bull wanders onto the property of
another and mates, the offspring belong to the owner of the cow, not
the owner of the wandering bull.280 The doctrine of acquisition by
find in sub-surface property holds that if an item is found embedded
in the soil, then it goes to the landowner even if that owner did not
know it existed.281 These doctrines support the proposition that the
burden lies with the owner of movable property to protect what is
rightfully his or hers, or risk losing it to those who find it first. In the
context of pollen drift, the burden lies with the patent holder to
protect its product.
There are additional solutions to eliminate the unintended
infringement caused by pollen drift that the patentees should be
responsible for implementing. For example, the patent holder could
limit drift by requiring that growers of its product have a buffer zone
around crops, or in some cases such as alfalfa, the product can be
harvested before pollen is released—greatly decreasing the likelihood

Complaint, supra note 11, at 1 (alleging inevitable harm to organic growers).
However, even if the farmer did benefit from the unintentional infringement,
trespass and nuisance in themselves can be harm that negates the application of
strict liability. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953)
(“[A]ny substantial nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land by any type of liability forming conduct is a private
nuisance . . . .”).
278. Supra note 277.
279. See Flood, supra note 158, at 486 (analogizing pollen drift cases to cases
involving wandering bulls, where courts place the burden of restraining the bulls on
the owner of the animal).
280. See Fuchser v. Jacobsen, 290 N.W.2d 449 (Neb. 1980) (discussing the
wandering bull doctrine). But see Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2001 FCT 256,
para. 93 (Can.) (rejecting and distinguishing the wandering bull argument by saying
Monsanto does not own the plant as a rancher owns a bull, but instead owns the
gene and has exclusive use), aff’d, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
281. See Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., (1886) 33 Ch.D. 562 (Eng.) (setting precedent for
finder’s law in property law by holding a landowner is in lawful possession of
everything in and under the land, referring to a boat found under the surface).
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of contamination.282 Additionally, counties could zone agricultural
areas by GM use, conventional use, and organic use. Alternatively,
such measures could be mandated by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
There are public policy reasons why there should be no patent
rights when a self-replicating patented organism causes injury. By
placing the burden to prevent contamination on the receiving (nonGM) farmer, that farmer may be incentivized to use GM seeds to
avoid being sued for patent infringement or to avoid losing a market
that requires GM labeling if contaminated. Moreover, if greater
numbers of farmers produce GM foods, the decrease in biodiversity
may put food security at risk because there are fewer breeds of food
to withstand various conditions.283 Additionally, extending patents to
self-replicated seed can unintentionally facilitate the control of the
majority of food by only a few who are able to direct price and supply.
Already, seed and crop statistics reveal the irreversible disappearance
of seed and crop diversity; in fact, “[o]f 80,000 edible plants used for
food, only about 150 are being cultivated, and just eight are traded
globally.284 Not surprisingly, this “erosion of diversity has been
propelled by the drive for homogenisation in industrial
agriculture.”285 As the protection for GM products continues, so do
the harmful effects on the general population, with consequences
that will effect civilization for years to come.
CONCLUSION
The self-replicating nature of some types of patented organisms,
such as seeds, demands that the patent system reexamine the full
exclusion rights of patents. The current Patent Act does not
accommodate patent subjects that can act without humans in
creating harm, and thus, lose their usefulness with absolutely no
human intervention. Such a situation should not warrant exclusion
rights because it goes beyond the usefulness requirement in utility
patents. Additionally, enforcing infringement rights where the same
act of infringement is also harming the “infringer” undermines the
282. See Can Roundup Ready Alfalfa Coexist with Organic and Conventional Alfalfa,
MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/roundup-ready-alfalfa-organiccoexist.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining this approach for alfalfa).
283. See MANIFESTO, supra note 117, at 7 (documenting the correlation between
“[t]oday’s industrial productivity strategies” and the disappearance of local seeds and
the disappearance of small farmers, local food cultures, and the local knowledge
about plant varieties in local ecological and cultural habitats).
284. Id. at 6.
285. Id. at 9–10.
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rule of law by violating ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Voiding
exclusion rights when the self-replicating patented organism is
injurious would not completely void the patent for GM seeds, but it
would prevent patent infringement suits when the patented organism
fails the moral utility test.
As biotechnology expands, biodiversity narrows, and super-weeds
grow,286 infringement suits will only increase in importance.
Unfortunately, narrowing patent rights in harmful situations will not
prevent pollen drift, but it will protect innocent farmers and possibly
the food supply.

286. See Justina Reichel, First ‘Superweed’ Appears in Western Canada, EPOCH TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2012, 12:45 AM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/firstsuperweed-appears-in-western-canada-178446.html (explaining the rise of weed
resistance to herbicides and GM traits); see also Jack Kaskey, Monsanto Corn May Be
Failing To Kill Bugs in 4 States, EPA Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 6. 2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-06/monsanto-corn-may-be-failing-tokill-bugs-in-4-states-epa-says.html (discussing rootworm resistance to Bt cotton in four
U.S. states and in India).

